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Hirohide Takikawa, Tokyo / Japan 
 
Free Riders Play Fair 
 
Abstract: After the demise of the social contract theory, the argument from fair play, which employs 
the  principle  of  fair  play,  has  been  widely  acknowledged  as  one  of  the  most  promising  ways  of 
justifying political obligation. First, I articulate the most promising version of the principle of fair 
play. Then, I show that free riders play fair, that is, that their moral fault lies not in unfairness but in 
the violation of a rule by appealing to the example of three-in-a-boat. Finally, I conclude that even the 
most promising version is false because those who have accepted benefits from a social cooperative 
scheme do not owe an obligation of fair play. 
Keywords: Political Obligation, Fair Play, Fairness, Free Riders 
 
I. The principle of fair play 
1. Hartian version 
It is commonly accepted that obligations in general can arise in, at least, two ways: naturally 
and  voluntarily.  Natural  duties  are  those  duties  that  one  owes  despite  his  actions.  For 
example, an individual has a natural duty to avoid cruelty even if he never promises to do so. 
In contrast, voluntary obligations are those that an individual incurs by consent. For example, 
if an individual promises to attend a party, he has an obligation to do so. The question then 
arises: Are there any other reasons upon which obligations may be grounded? 
H. L. A. Hart answers this question by referring to the principle of “the mutuality of 
restrictions.” This principle, he explains, consists of the following: 
 
When a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise according to rules and thus restrict 
their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions when required have a right to a 
similar submission from those who have benefited by their submission (Hart 1955:185). 
 
It follows from the correlativity between right and duty that those who have benefited from a 
joint enterprise have a duty to obey its rules. Here, Hart mentions two conditions required to 
apply the principle: (1) a number of individuals conduct joint enterprise and (2) they benefit 
from it. The mutuality of restrictions is justified “because it is fair; and it is fair because only 
so will there be an equal distribution of restrictions and so of freedom among this group of 
men” (Hart 1955:191). The mutuality of restrictions, which is currently referred to as “the 
principle of fair play” or “the principle of fairness,” derives from the equal distribution of 2 
benefits and burdens. Hart also claims that political obligation is intelligible only by referring 
to this principle (Hart 1955:185). After the demise of the social contract theory, the argument 
from fair play, which employs the principle of fair play, has been widely acknowledged as 
one of the most promising ways of justifying political obligation. 
The logical structure of the argument from fair play can be analyzed as follows: 
 
(F1) If someone has received benefits from a joint enterprise under certain conditions, 
then he has an obligation to cooperate while engaging in it. 
(F2) A citizen has received benefits from the state. 
(F3) Therefore, a citizen has an obligation to cooperate in the state. 
 
It is important to understand appropriately the term “under certain conditions” in (F1) to 
defend the argument from fair play. A major contribution was made by John Rawls. 
 
2. Rawlsian version 
In his article, “Legal Duty and The Duty of Fair Play,” Rawls argues that the moral duty to 
obey the law is a case of the duty of fair play and ascribes to it a formula: 
 
The principle of fair play may be defined as follows. Suppose there is a mutually beneficial 
and just scheme of social cooperation, and that the advantages it yields can only be obtained if 
everyone, or nearly everyone, cooperates. Suppose further that cooperation requires a certain 
sacrifice from each person, or at least involves a certain restriction of his liberty. Suppose 
finally that the benefits produced by cooperation are, up to a certain point, free: that is, the 
scheme of cooperation is unstable in the sense that if any one person knows that all (or nearly 
all) of the others will continued to do their part, he will still be able to share a gain from the 
scheme even if he does not do his part. Under these conditions a person who has accepted the 
benefits of the scheme is bound by a duty of fair play to do his part and not to take advantage 
of the free benefits by not cooperation (Rawls 1964:122). 
 
Here,  Rawls  adds  two  conditions  to  the  principle.  First,  for  the  principle  to  apply,  it  is 
insufficient that a scheme of social cooperation (“joint enterprise,” in Hart’s terminology) 
exists; instead, it is necessary that it is just. Conversely, the principle does not hold under an 
unjust scheme. Second, individuals are not bound by a duty merely by receiving benefits; 
rather, it is necessary that they “accept” the benefits. Rawls claims that the duty to obey the 3 
law  depends  on  “our  own  voluntary  acts”  (Rawls  1964:123).
1  The  former,  the  justice 
condition, is criticized for two reasons. First, the principle of fair play holds even in an unjust 
cooperative scheme such as a mafia. A lazy, uncooperative mafia member may be identified 
as unfair by his associates.
2 Second, in an unjust cooperative scheme, those who are allocated 
a fair share of benefits have an obligation to cooperate, but those who are not lack the same 
obligation. It implies that the principle does not depend on justice; instead, it depends on the 
benefits acquired from the cooperative scheme (Simmons 1979:110–114). 
 
II. Two conditions: benefit and acceptance 
It is helpful to specify the conditions for the principle of fair play to review the objections 
levied against it. Robert Nozick harshly criticizes the principle using the example of “a public 
address system” (Nozick 1974:93). Suppose that several neighbors take turns running the 
public address entertainment system. Nozick claims that, even if one neighbor receives the 
benefit of listening to the system, she is not obliged to take a turn at operating it. He gives two 
reasons to support this argument. First, unless the received benefits exceed the costs that an 
individual pays to run the system, she has no obligation to run it. Here, it is necessary to insert 
“the  benefits  outweighing  costs  clause”  into  the  principle  of  fair  play  (Nozick  1974:94). 
Second, and more important, no individual ever owes an obligation without consenting to it. 
Nozick maintains that “[o]ne cannot, whatever one’s purposes, just act so as to give people 
benefits and then demand (or seize) payment” (Nozick 1974:95). In brief, it is objectionable 
and unacceptable that those upon whom some benefits are “imposed” have an obligation to 
cooperate. To evade the problem of being “imposed,” it is necessary, according to Nozick, to 
incorporate a cost-benefit analysis and the need for actual consent into the principle. 
 
1. The acceptance condition 
The actual consent condition seems to turn the principle of fair play into the principle of 
consent: those who give consent are obliged. To rescue the principle of fair play, it is essential 
to weaken the condition. John Simmons defends the principle of fair play by referring to the 
fact that the acceptance of benefits is significantly distinct from both the receipt of benefits 
and  the  actual  consent  (Simmons  1979:  118–136).  On  the  one  hand,  if  someone  merely 
receives the benefits from a joint enterprise, he might not have an obligation to cooperate; 
                                                           
1 Rawls keeps his position on the two conditions in his A Theory of Justice (Rawls 1971:111). 
2 While an uncooperative member is unfair, he is not unjust; he is right in not participating in illegal activities. 
We might even say that he has a duty not to cooperate. It implies that we have a natural duty to be just. An 
obligation of fair play with the justice condition collapses into a natural duty to be just. I do not discuss it further 
in this paper. 4 
even if he does not give an actual consent to the joint enterprise, he might have such an 
obligation. On the other hand, if an individual accepts the benefits from the joint enterprise, 
he should have such an obligation. Simmons agrees with Rawls on the acceptance condition.  
It is yet unexamined when an individual is considered to have accepted benefits. As such, 
it  is  essential  to  distinguish  between  benefits  received  from  excludable  goods  and  those 
received from non-excludable goods. The former is, metaphorically, an ambulance and the 
latter is a patrol car. It is easy to confirm whether an individual has accepted benefits from 
excludable  goods,  such  as  ambulance  service;  it  is  sufficient  if  he  attempted  to  get  the 
benefits. However, it is difficult to determine whether an individual has accepted benefits 
from non-excludable goods, such as local security, because he cannot avoid receiving them 
even if he does not want to do so. As an individual cannot voluntarily accept unavoidable 
benefits, unavoidability (non-excludability) entails unacceptability. If we hold the acceptance 
condition, we must face difficulties in dealing with non-excludable goods. 
Richard Arneson objects to the acceptance condition, claiming that the mere receipt of 
benefits generates the duty of fair play by appealing to the self-benefit principle, which claims 
that “moral rules should be so constructed that, if rules are obeyed, the acts of each person 
benefit or harm only himself, except as he himself chooses to confer or exchange the benefits 
of  his  acts”  (Arneson  1982:626).
3  The  principle  implies  that  the  benefits  from  a  joint 
enterprise  must  be  shared  only  among  participants,  and,  therefore,  that  those  who  have 
received the benefits have an obligation to cooperate. They have an obligation of fair play 
because collective goods would not be supplied without their cooperation. However, the self-
benefit  principle  depends  on  an  unjustified  assumption  that  any  collective  good,  either 
beneficial  to  a  particular  individual  or  to  everyone,  should  be  supplied,  and  makes  an 
unacceptable claim that the suppliers of non-excludable goods have the right to collect a fee 
from all. 
 
2. The benefit condition 
As a means  of rejecting the acceptance condition,  George Klosko  focuses on the benefit 
condition. Klosko believes that “the principle of fairness grounds obligations on the receipt of 
benefits rather than voluntary actions by recipients” (Klosko 2004:148). Once the acceptance 
condition is relaxed, it might be possible to defend the principle of fair play by constricting 
the benefit condition. Klosko maintains that an obligation to cooperate can be generated by 
the supply of non-excludable goods, but only if a cooperative scheme meets three conditions: 
                                                           
3 Arneson borrows the principle from Alan Gibbard.  5 
(1) the benefits must be worth their cost, as Nozick also proposes; (2) the benefits must be 
presumptively  beneficial;  and,  (3)  the  overall  distribution  of  benefits  and  burdens  in  the 
cooperative  scheme  must  be  acceptably  fair  (Klosko  2004:xx,  cf.  39).  “Presumptively 
beneficial” goods in the second condition fall along the lines of Rawls’s “primary goods”; that 
is,  “things  that  every  rational  man  is  presumed  to  want”  (Rawls  1999:54).  However,  the 
former is much narrower than the latter in that it is confined to public goods and indispensible 
to  acceptable  lives  (Klosko  2004:40).  At  the  core  of  presumptively  beneficial  goods  lies 
security: national  defense, law and  order, and environmental protection. Since security is 
confined  to  public  goods  and  is  indispensible  to  acceptable  lives,  it  is  presumptively 
beneficial.  On  the  other  hand,  classical  public  goods  such  as  streets  and  ports  are  not 
presumptively  beneficial  because  they  are  not  indispensible  to  acceptable  lives  (Klosko 
2004:xv–xxiv). Provisions of social security, such as aid to dependent children and old-age 
pensions, are not justified by the principle of fairness because they are not presumptively 
beneficial to everyone. In simple terms, Klosko strengthens the benefit condition to discard 
the acceptance condition.  
However, it is far from clear why the principle of fairness does not ground obligations in 
cases of less important goods. There is no reason to believe that those who receive trivially 
valuable goods have no duty to cooperate while those who receive very valuable goods have 
an obligation of fair play (McDermott 2004:224). The principle of fair play has nothing to do 
with the magnitude of benefits; rather, it requires not taking advantage of the cooperative 
sacrifices  of  others  (Simmons  2001:34).  Simmons  observes  that  presumptively  beneficial 
goods are more likely to be freely accepted than are trivial goods, and that, therefore, “it is 
free acceptance, not presumptive value, that does the moral work” in the argument from fair 
play (Simmons 2001:35). Klosko’s argument does not, even if successful in its conclusion, 
rely on the principle of fair play. 
Thus  understood,  the  principle  of  fair  play  does  not  appeal  to  the  balance  between 
benefits and costs to each individual. It is different from the principle of beneficiary pays. 
Rather, it concentrates on the relation among participants in a social cooperative scheme. It 
entails that no one individual should take advantage of cooperators. This is why the principle 
of fair play rejects “free riders.” Free riders do not pay a fair share to use public transportation 
and,  therefore,  play  unfairly,  mainly  by  evading  their  share  of  the  burden  and  taking 
advantage of other passengers. 
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3. Fairness and equality 
M. B. E. Smith indicates that the principle of fair play does not establish an obligation to obey 
the law (Smith 1973:81–83). The obligation of fair play regulates our actions “only when 
some benefit or harm turn whether he obeys.” Conversely, when an individual’s actions do 
not affect others, he does not owe any obligation. Obedience to the law often benefits no one 
and disobedience to the law harms no one. Richard Dagger objects to Smith by stating the 
following: 
 
What Smith overlooks is the consideration that itself underlies the notion of fairness: the 
conviction that everyone involved in a practice is to be treated as an equal. This holds even 
when the interests of the parties involved are not affected, directly or indirectly, for one may 
be wronged (deceived, treated unfairly) without being harmed. (Dagger 1997:71, Takikawa’s 
emphasis) 
 
The point is that at the core of the principle of fairness lies the idea of equality. Cooperators 
are  treated  unfairly  in  a  social  scheme  that  allows  free  riders—not  because  they  are 
beneficially disadvantaged, but because they are not recognized the same moral status as free 
riders. Equality, not benefit, is the moral essence of the principle of fair play. The argument 
from fair play, therefore, insists that we have a duty to obey the law not because the law 
supplies  public  utility,  but  because  the  law  combines  with  the  ideal  of  equality  (Kramer 
1999:280). When Dworkin maintains that the correct understanding of the principle of fair 
play is a necessary condition for political legitimacy, he finds the relation between fairness 
and equal treatment (Dworkin 1986:195). 
A liberal interpretation of equality, specifically, an understanding that treating everyone 
as  an  equal  implies  treating  everyone  as  an  autonomous  individual,  requires  providing 
everyone with a veto over participating in a joint enterprise. Thus, it is necessary to add the 
acceptance condition to the principle of fair play. The benefit condition is insufficient to 
protect an autonomous individual because it ignores each individual’s estimate and allows for 
a paternalistic evaluation of the benefits provided by a cooperative scheme. As such, it seems 
necessary to revise the principle of fair play (F1) to the following: 
 
(F1’) If someone has accepted benefits from a joint enterprise, then he has an obligation 
to cooperate in it. 
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III. Three in a Boat 
1. The state of nature 
To evaluate the validity of (F1’), it is necessary to examine the state of nature. A classical 
answer to the question of political obligation is the social contract theory: people settled a 
social contract to avoid inconveniences in the state of nature. One common approach is to 
depict the state of nature as the prisoner’s dilemma, which is, as Hobbes described it, the “war 
of every man against every man (bellum omnium contra omnes)” (Hobbes 1642: XIII, p. 90). 
Recently, however, several authors have held that a better approach is to depict the dilemma 
as the stag hunt, similar to what Rousseau once illustrated (Skyrms 2004, Pettit 2008:113).
4 
Hume also has the stag hunt when saying that “two men, who pull the oars of a boat, do it by 
an  agreement  or  convention,  tho’  they  have  never  given  promises  to  each  other”  (Hume 
1639–1640:3.2.2,  315).  To  examine  the  principle  of  fair  play,  it  is  necessary  to  change 
Hume’s boat, a two-person stag hunt, into a three-person stag hunt. This revised game is 
referred to as “three-in-a-boat” (Skyrms 2004:117). The boat runs when two rowers row. All 
of them (x, y, and z) prefer that the boat runs, but they all prefer a leisurely ride to actually 
rowing. Three-in-a-boat has the following payoff structure
5: 
 
Three-in-a-boat 
  when z Cooperates (rows)       when z Defects (does not row) 
x＼y  Cooperate  Defect    x＼y  Cooperate  Defect 
Cooperate  3,3,3  2,6,2  Cooperate  2,2,6  0,1,1 
Defect  6,2,2  1,0,0  Defect  1,0,0  1,1,1 
 
 
This game has four Nash equilibria: (D,C,C), (C,D,C), (C,C,D), and (D,D,D). The last one 
indicates that no one rows, and then the boat does not run. It is important to address the 
former three in which two out of three rows and one of them does not row, and then the boat 
advances. Any of them is an equilibrium because (1) if one of the two rowers stop rowing 
while holding the others’ strategies fixed, the boats does not run, and then her utility drops 
from 2 to 1; (2) if a non-cooperator rows while holding the others’ strategies fixed, the boat 
still runs, but her utility drops from 6 to 3. Moreover, all of them are Pareto efficient, i.e., no 
                                                           
4 In his Discours sur l’Origine et les Fondements de l’Inégalité parmi les Hommes, Rousseau wrote, “if it was a 
matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain faithful to his post; but if a hare happened to 
pass within reach of one of them, we cannot doubt that he would have gone off in pursuit of it without scruple.” 
(Rousseau 1755:96–97) 
5 I make such a slight change in ‘Battle of the Rowers Game’ (Almendares and Landa 2007:516) that the three 
equilibria which are Pareto efficient are also Kardor-Hicks efficient. 8 
one is better off without making someone else worse off; they are also Kaldor-Hicks efficient, 
i.e., everyone is better off if a better-off person would compensate worse-off persons. Finally, 
universal cooperation, i.e., (C, C, C), is neither a Nash equilibrium nor efficient in both the 
Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks criteria. There is no reason to require the slacker to cooperate in 
rowing. 
 
2. Free riders play fair 
Three-in-a-boat demonstrates that it is possible to reach an efficient equilibrium even while 
some individuals are “free riders.” Free riders do not threaten an efficient order.
6 Universal 
cooperation is unnecessary; large scale cooperation is sufficient. 
It  is  important  to  note  that  when  noncooperation  is  distributed  through  some  fair 
procedure, free riders must be considered fair. Conscription serves as an example of this 
(Rawls 1971:380). A universal draft, which requires everyone to have an equal burden of 
national defense, might be considered the fairest. However, a partial draft, which selects some 
individuals through fair procedures such as rotation or a lottery, is as fair as a universal draft. 
In addition, when volunteers give informed consent, a voluntary service system is also fair. 
Those who do not join the armed forces can be viewed as fair free riders. It might, perhaps, 
seem that free riders play unfairly, but they are made fair through a fair procedure; thus, they 
never contradict the idea of equality. 
It is worth noting that “prior occupation,” in addition to rotation, lottery, and informed 
consent,  sometimes makes  the actions  of free riders fair. To explain this,  it is  helpful to 
slightly modify the three-in-a-boat example so that it has a free rider seat. Anyone taking the 
seat is exempted from an obligation to row and may enjoy a free ride. Suppose that x occupies 
the seat first. There is no element of unfairness in doing so. Those who are prior in time have 
a stronger right (qui prior tempore potior iure). Then, the other two, i.e., y and z, arrive. They 
willingly row because they prefer that the boat moves. As shown in this example, a free rider 
can  be  understood  as  an  individual  who  occupies  a  special  position  that  is  free  of  the 
obligation to cooperate. When someone occupies such a position prior to everyone else, he 
does not cooperate, but may benefit from the cooperative scheme, whereas everyone else has 
obligations  to  cooperate.  It  is  true  that  not  all  cases  of  occupation  can  be  justified,  but 
occupation under certain conditions, such as the Lockean provisos, can be defended.
7 
                                                           
6 Note that when the imitation probability is high and the discount rate is low, it is an evolutionarily stable 
strategy for all to defect (D, D, D) (Skyrms 2004:120–122). 
7 Kant writes that “the only condition under which appropriation (apprehensio) as the beginning of holding a 
corporeal thing in space (possessionis physicae) conforms with the law of everyone’s external freedom (hence a 
prori) is that of priority of time, only in so far as it is the first appropriation (prior apprehensio), which is an act 9 
The circumstances of law are similar to the structure of three-in-a-boat. A legal system is 
often regarded as a seamless web, but it is not a strained web; it has a “slack.” It works well 
even where a number of crimes are committed. Universal obedience is unnecessary; large 
scale obedience is sufficient. This does not mean that those who disobey the law rightly 
occupy a special position that is free of the obligation to obey the law. Rather, they are to be 
blamed not because they are free riders against the principle of fair play, but because they 
cannot justify their disobedience by appealing to any justifiable procedures such as rotation, 
lottery,  or  prior  occupation.  The  conclusion  is  that  free  riders  are  not  unfair,  but  instead 
violate a law  with  no excuses justified by procedural  rules.  Their moral  fault lies  not  in 
unfairness but in the violation of a rule. 
My argument should contrast with Rawls’s objection against the principle of fair play. In 
A Theory of Justice, Rawls rejects the argument from fair play and writes that “there is, I 
believe, no political obligation, strictly speaking, for citizens generally” (Rawls 1971:114). 
He rather develops a natural duty of justice as an argument for political obligation (Rawls 
1971:115). Rawls suggests two reasons for this change in his position (Rawls 1971:336–337). 
First, since individuals are born into a political system, they do not have, in an appropriate 
sense, voluntarily accepted its benefits. Second, and more important, the principle of fair play 
tends to deteriorate the instability of a political system. It would complicate the assurance 
problem because it merely justifies a conditional obligation—you should obey the law only 
when almost everyone else follows it. Three-in-a-boat is accurately a three-person hybrid of 
the prisoner’s dilemma, the chicken, and the stag hunt, often called the “assurance game” 
(Skyrms 2004:120). Rawls focuses on a stag hunt aspect of the game and demonstrates that it 
may reach a social dilemma: a Pareto inefficient equilibrium, (D, D, D). He concludes that the 
principle of fair play does not solve the dilemma. My argument concentrates on a chicken 
aspect and indicates that it may reach an efficient equilibrium, (C, C, D), (C, D, C), or (D, C, 
C). It shows that a social dilemma never exists even where some ride free and, in doing so, 
contravene the principle of fair play. The most promising version of the principle of fair play 
(F1’) is therefore false; individuals do not owe an obligation of fair play even when they have 
accepted benefits from a social cooperative scheme. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
of voluntary power. . . . Such a unilateral action as appropriation can be justified only when it is contained in the 
a priori united absolutely commanding will of all” (Kant 1797:VI.263). That is, prior occupation is justified 
when it is in accord with a general will. 10 
* I am very grateful to Tatsuo Inoue and Massimo Renzo for their helpful comments. The 
research for this paper was funded by Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C) 20530015 
from Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS).  
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